Martingale approach to stochastic differential games of control and
  stopping by Karatzas, Ioannis & Zamfirescu, Ingrid-Mona
ar
X
iv
:0
80
8.
36
56
v1
  [
ma
th.
PR
]  
27
 A
ug
 20
08
The Annals of Probability
2008, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1495–1527
DOI: 10.1214/07-AOP367
c© Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 2008
MARTINGALE APPROACH TO STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL
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Columbia University and Baruch College, CUNY
We develop a martingale approach for studying continuous-time
stochastic differential games of control and stopping, in a non-Markovian
framework and with the control affecting only the drift term of the
state-process. Under appropriate conditions, we show that the game
has a value and construct a saddle pair of optimal control and stop-
ping strategies. Crucial in this construction is a characterization of
saddle pairs in terms of pathwise and martingale properties of suit-
able quantities.
1. Introduction and synopsis. We develop a theory for zero-sum stochas-
tic differential games with two players, a “controller” and a “stopper.” The
state X(·) in these games evolves in Euclidean space according to a stochas-
tic functional/differential equation driven by a Wiener process; via his choice
of instantaneous, nonanticipative control u(t), the controller can affect the
local drift of this state process X(·) at time t, though not its local variance.
The stopper decides the duration of the game, in the form of a stopping
rule τ for the process X(·). At the terminal time τ the stopper receives
from the controller a “reward”
∫ τ
0 h(t,X,ut)dt+ g(X(τ)) consisting of two
parts: The integral up to time τ of a time-dependent running reward h,
which also depends on the past and present states X(s),0 ≤ s ≤ t, and on
the present value ut of the control; and the value at the terminal state X(τ)
of a continuous terminal reward function g (“reward” always refers to the
stopper).
Under appropriate conditions on the local drift and local variance of the
state process, and on the running and terminal cost functions h and g,
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we establish the existence of a value for the resulting stochastic game of
control and stopping, as well as regularity and martingale-type properties
of the temporal evolution for the resulting value process. We also construct
optimal strategies for the two players, in the form of a saddle point (u∗, τ∗),
to wit: the strategy u∗(·) is the controller’s best response to the stopper’s
use of the stopping rule τ∗, in the sense of minimizing total expected cost;
and the stopping rule τ∗ is the stopper’s best response to the controller’s
use of the control strategy u∗(·), in the sense of maximizing total expected
reward.
The approach of the paper is direct and probabilistic. It draws on the
Dubins–Savage (1965) theory, and builds on the martingale methodologies
developed for the optimal stopping problem and for the problem of opti-
mal stochastic control over the last three decades; see, for instance, Neveu
(1975), El Karoui (1981), Benesˇ (1970, 1971), Rishel (1970), Duncan and
Varaiya (1971), Davis and Varaiya (1973), Davis (1973, 1979) and Elliott
(1977, 1982). It proceeds in terms of a characterization of saddle points via
martingale-type properties of suitable quantities, which involve the value
process of the game.
An advantage of the approach is that it imposes no Markovian assump-
tions on the dynamics of the state-process; it allows the local drift and vari-
ance of the state-process, as well as the running cost, to depend at any given
time t on past-and-present states X(s),0≤ s≤ t, in a fairly general, measur-
able manner. (The boundedness and continuity assumptions can most likely
be relaxed.)
The main drawback of this approach is that it imposes a severe nonde-
generacy condition on the local variance of the state-process, and does not
allow this local variance to be influenced by the controller. We hope that
subsequent work will be able to provide a more general theory for such
stochastic games, possibly also for their nonzero-sum counterparts, without
such restrictive assumptions—at least in the Markovian framework of, say,
Fleming and Soner (2006), El Karoui, Nguyen and Jeanblanc-Picque´ (1987),
Bensoussan and Lions (1982) or Bismut (1973, 1978). It would also be of
considerable interest to provide a theory for control of “bounded variation”
type (admixture of absolutely continuous, as in this paper, with pure jump
and singular, terms).
Extant work: A game between a controller and a stopper, in discrete time
and with Polish (complete separable metric) state-space, was studied by
Maitra and Sudderth (1996b); under appropriate conditions, these authors
obtained the existence of a value for the game and provided a transfinite
induction algorithm for its computation.
In Karatzas and Sudderth (2001) a similar game was studied for a linear
diffusion process, with the unit interval as its state-space and absorption
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at the endpoints. The one-dimensional nature of the setup allowed an ex-
plicit computation of the value and of a saddle pair of strategies, based on
scale-function considerations and under a nondegeneracy condition on the
variance of the diffusion. Karatzas and Sudderth (2007) studied recently
nonzero-sum versions of these linear diffusion games, where one seeks and
constructs Nash equilibria, rather than saddle pairs, of strategies. Always in
a Markovian, one-dimensional framework, Weerasinghe (2006) was able to
solve in a similar, explicit manner, a stochastic game with variance that is
allowed to degenerate; while Bayraktar and Young (2007) established a very
interesting convex-duality connection, between a stochastic game of control
and stopping and a probability-of-ruin-minimization problem.
Along a parallel tack, stochastic games of stopping have been treated
via the theory of Backwards Stochastic Differential Equations starting with
Cvitanic´ and Karatzas (1996), and continuing with Hamade`ne and Lepeltier
(1995, 2000) and Hamade`ne (2006) for games of mixed control/stopping.
The methods used in the present paper are entirely different from those
in all these works.
• The coo¨perative version of the game has received far greater attention. In
the standard model of stochastic control, treated, for instance, in the classic
monograph Fleming and Soner (1992), the controller may influence the state
dynamics but must operate over a prescribed time-horizon. If the controller
is also allowed to choose a quitting time adaptively, at the expense of in-
curring a termination cost, one has a problem of control with discretionary
stopping [or “leavable” control problem, in the terminology of Dubins and
Savage (1976)]. General existence/characterization results for such problems
were obtained by Dubins and Savage (1976) and by Maitra and Sudderth
(1996a) under the rubric of “leavable” stochastic control; by Krylov (1980),
El Karoui (1981), Bensoussan and Lions (1982), Haussmann and Lepeltier
(1990), Maitra and Sudderth (1996a), Morimoto (2003), Ceci and Basan
(2004); and by Karatzas and Zamfirescu (2006) in the present framework.
There are also several explicitly solvable problems in this vein: see Benesˇ
(1992), Davis and Zervos (1994), Karatzas and Sudderth (1999), Karatzas
et al. (2000), Karatzas and Wang (2000, 2001), Kamizono and Morimoto
(2002), Karatzas and Ocone (2002), Ocone and Weerasinghe (2006).
Such problems arise, for instance, in target-tracking models, where one
has to stay close to a target by spending fuel, declare when one has ar-
rived “sufficiently close,” then decide whether to engage the target or not.
Combined stochastic control/optimal stopping problems also arise in math-
ematical finance, namely, in the context of computing the upper-hedging
prices of American contingent claims under constraints; these computations
lead to stochastic control of the absolutely continuous or the singular type
[e.g. Karatzas and Kou (1998), Karatzas and Wang (2000)].
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The computation of the lower-hedging prices for American contingent
claims under constraints leads to stochastic games of control and stopping;
see Karatzas and Kou (1998) for details.
Synopsis: We set up in the next section the model for a controlled stochastic
functional/differential equation driven by a Wiener process, that will be used
throughout the paper; this setting is identical to that of Elliott (1982) and
of our earlier paper Karatzas and Zamfirescu (2006). Within this model,
we formulate in Section 3 the stochastic game of control and stopping that
will be the focus of our study. Section 4 reviews in the present context
the classical results for optimal stopping on the one hand, and for optimal
stochastic control on the other, when these problems are viewed separately.
Section 5 establishes the existence of a value for the stochastic game,
and studies the regularity and some simple martingale-like properties of
the resulting value process evolving through time. This study continues in
earnest in Section 6 and culminates with Theorem 6.3.
Section 7 then builds on these results, to provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for a pair (u, τ) consisting of a control strategy and a stopping
rule, to be a saddle point for the stochastic game. These conditions are
couched in terms of martingale-like properties for suitable quantities, which
involve the value process and the cumulative running reward. A similar
characterization is provided in Section 8 for the optimality of a given control
strategy u(·).
With the help of the predictable representation property of the Brownian
filtration under equivalent changes of probability measure, and of the Doob–
Meyer decomposition for sufficiently regular submartingales, this character-
ization leads—in Section 9, and under appropriate conditions—to a specific
control strategy u∗(·) as a candidate for optimality. These same martingale-
type conditions suggest τ∗, the first time the value process V (·) of the game
agrees with the terminal reward g(X(·)), as a candidate for optimal stopping
rule. Finally, it is shown that the pair (u∗, τ∗) is indeed a saddle point of the
stochastic game, and that V (· ∧ τ∗) has continuous paths.
Notation. The paper is quite heavy with notation, so here is a partial
list for ease of reference:
X(t),W u(t): Equations (1), (6) and equation (4), respectively.
Λu(t),Λu(t, τ): Exponential likelihood ratios (martingales); equations (3)
and (25).
Y u(t, τ), Y u(τ): Total (i.e., terminal, plus running) cost/reward on the in-
terval [[t, τ ]]: equations (8), (23).
V ,V and V (t), V (t): Upper and lower values of the game; equations (9),
(11), (12).
J(t, τ): Minimal conditional expected total cost on the interval [[t, τ ]]; equa-
tion (14).
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Zu(t): Maximal conditional expected reward under control u(·), from time
t onward; equation (19).
Qu(t): Cumulative maximal conditional expected reward under control u(·),
at time t; equation (20).
Ru(t): Cumulative value of game under control u(·), at t; equation (36).
τut (ε), τ
u
t : Stopping rules; equation (22).
̺t(ε), ̺t: Stopping rules; equation (33).
H(t,ω, a, p): Hamiltonian function; equation (72).
Saddle Point : Inequalities (10).
Thrifty Control Strategy : Requirement (66).
2. The model. Consider the space Ω =C([0, T ];Rn) of continuous func-
tions ω : [0, T ]→ Rn, defined on a given bounded interval [0, T ] and tak-
ing values in some Euclidean space Rn. The coo¨rdinate mapping process
will be denoted by W (t,ω) = ω(t),0≤ t≤ T , and FWt = σ(W (s); 0≤ s≤ t),
0≤ t≤ T , will stand for the natural filtration generated by this process W .
The measurable space (Ω,FWT ) will be endowed with Wiener measure P,
under which W becomes a standard n-dimensional Brownian motion. We
shall denote by F= {Ft}0≤t≤T the P-augmentation of this natural filtration,
and use the notation ‖ω‖∗t := max0≤s≤t |ω(s)|, ω ∈Ω,0≤ t≤ T .
The σ-algebra of predictable subsets of the product space [0, T ]×Ω will
be denoted by P , and S will stand for the collection of stopping rules of the
filtration F. These are measurable mappings τ : Ω→ [0, T ] with the property
{τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft ∀0≤ t≤ T.
Given any two stopping rules ρ and ν with ρ≤ ν, we shall denote by Sρ,ν
the collection of all stopping rules τ ∈ S with ρ≤ τ ≤ ν.
Consider now a predictable (i.e., P-measurable) σ : [0, T ]×Ω→ L(Rn;Rn)
with values in the space L(Rn;Rn) of (n × n) matrices, and suppose that
σ(t,ω) is nonsingular for every (t,ω) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω and that there exists some
real constant K > 0 for which
‖σ−1(t,ω)‖ ≤K and |σij(t,ω)− σij(t, ω˜)| ≤K‖ω− ω˜‖
∗
t ∀1≤ i, j ≤ n,
hold for every ω ∈Ω, ω˜ ∈Ω and every t ∈ [0, T ]. Then for any initial condition
x ∈ Rn, there is a pathwise unique, strong solution X(·) of the stochastic
equation
X(t) = x+
∫ t
0
σ(s,X)dW (s), 0≤ t≤ T ;(1)
see Theorem 14.6 in Elliott (1982). In particular, the augmentation of the
natural filtration generated by X(·) coincides with the filtration F itself.
Now let us introduce an element of control in this picture. We shall denote
by U the class of admissible control strategies u : [0, T ]× Ω→ A. These are
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predictable processes with values in some given separable metric space A.
We shall assume that A is a countable union of nonempty, compact subsets,
and is endowed with the σ-algebra A of its Borel subsets.
We shall consider also a P ⊗A-measurable function f : ([0, T ]×Ω)×A→
R
n with the following properties:
• for each a ∈A, the mapping (t,ω) 7→ f(t,ω, a) is predictable; and
• there exists a real constant K > 0 such that
|f(t,ω, a)| ≤K(1 + ‖ω‖∗t ) ∀0≤ t≤ T,ω ∈Ω, a ∈A.(2)
For any given admissible control strategy u(·) ∈ U, the exponential process
Λu(t) := exp
{∫ t
0
〈σ−1(s,X)f(s,X,us), dW (s)〉
(3)
− 12
∫ t
0
|σ−1(s,X)f(s,X,us)|
2 ds
}
0≤ t≤ T , is a martingale under all these assumptions; namely, E(Λu(T )) = 1
[see Benesˇ (1971), as well as Karatzas and Shreve (1991), pages 191 and 200
for this result]. Then the Girsanov theorem (ibid., Section 3.5) guarantees
that the process
W u(t) :=W (t)−
∫ t
0
σ−1(s,X)f(s,X,us)ds, 0≤ t≤ T(4)
is a Brownian motion with respect to the filtration F, under the new prob-
ability measure
P
u(B) := E[Λu(T ) · 1B ], B ∈ FT ,(5)
which is equivalent to P. It is now clear from the equations (1) and (4) that
X(t) = x+
∫ t
0
f(s,X,us)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s,X)dW u(s), 0≤ t≤ T,(6)
holds almost surely. This will be our model for a controlled stochastic func-
tional/differential equation, with the control appearing only in the drift
(bounded variation) term.
3. The stochastic game of control and stopping. In order to specify the
objective of our stochastic game of control and stopping, let us consider two
bounded, measurable functions h : [0, T ] × Ω × A→ R and g :Rn → R. We
shall assume that the running reward function h satisfies the measurability
conditions imposed on the drift-function f above, except of course that (2)
is now strengthened to the boundedness requirement
|h(t,ω, a)| ≤K ∀0≤ t≤ T, ω ∈Ω, a ∈A.(7)
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To simplify the analysis, we shall assume that the terminal reward function
g is continuous.
We shall study a stochastic game of control and stopping with two players:
The controller, who chooses an admissible control strategy u(·) in U; and
the stopper, who decides the duration of the game by his choice of stopping
rule τ ∈ S . When the stopper declares the game to be over, he receives from
the controller the amount Y u(τ)≡ Y u(0, τ), where
Y u(t, τ) := g(X(τ)) +
∫ τ
t
h(s,X,us)ds for τ ∈ St,T , t ∈ S.(8)
It is thus in the best interest of the controller (resp., the stopper) to make the
amount Y u(τ) as small (resp., as large) as possible, at least on the average.
We are thus led to a stochastic game, with
V := inf
u∈U
sup
τ∈S
E
u(Y u(τ)), V := sup
τ∈S
inf
u∈U
E
u(Y u(τ))(9)
as its upper- and lower-values, respectively; clearly, V ≤ V .
We shall say that the game has a value, if its upper- and lower-values
coincide, that is, V = V ; in that case we shall denote this common value
simply by V .
A pair (u∗, τ∗) ∈ U×S will be called saddle point of the game, if
E
u∗(Y u
∗
(τ))≤ Eu
∗
(Y u
∗
(τ∗))≤ E
u(Y u(τ∗))(10)
holds for every u(·) ∈ U and τ ∈ S . In words, the strategy u∗(·) is the con-
troller’s best response to the stopper’s use of the rule τ∗; and the rule τ∗ is
the stopper’s best response to the controller’s use of the strategy u∗(·).
If such a saddle-point pair (u∗, τ∗) exists, then it is quite clear that the
game has a value. We shall characterize the saddle property in terms of
simple, pathwise and martingale properties of certain crucial quantities; see
Theorem 7.1. Then, in Sections 8 and 9, we shall use this characterization
in an effort to show that a saddle point indeed exists and to identify its
components.
In this effort we shall need to consider, a little more generally than in (9),
the upper-value-process
V (t) := essinf
u∈U
esssup
τ∈St,T
E
u(Y u(t, τ)|Ft)(11)
and the lower-value-process
V (t) := esssup
τ∈St,T
essinf
u∈U
E
u(Y u(t, τ)|Ft)(12)
of the game, for each t ∈ S . Clearly, V (0) = V , V (0) = V , as well as
g(X(t)) ≤ V (t)≤ V (t) ∀ t ∈ S.(13)
We shall see in Theorem 5.1 that this last inequality holds, in fact, as an
equality: the game has a value at all times.
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4. Optimal control and stopping problems, viewed separately. Given
any stopping rule t ∈ S , we introduce the minimal conditional expected cost
J(t, τ) := essinf
v∈U
E
v(Y v(t, τ)|Ft),(14)
that can be achieved by the controller over the stochastic interval
[[t, τ ]] := {(s,ω) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω: t(ω)≤ s≤ τ(ω)},(15)
for each stopping rule τ ∈ St,T . With the notation (14), the lower value (12)
of the game becomes
V (t) = esssup
τ∈St,T
J(t, τ)≥ J(t, t) = g(X(t)) a.s.(16)
By analogy with the classical martingale approach to stochastic control
[developed by Rishel (1970), Duncan and Varaiya (1971), Davis and Varaiya
(1973), Davis (1973) and outlined in Davis (1979), El Karoui (1981)], for any
given admissible control strategy u(·) ∈ U and any stopping rules t, ν, τ with
0≤ t≤ ν ≤ τ ≤ T , we have the Pu-submartingale property
E
u(Ψu(ν, τ)|Ft)≥Ψ
u(t, τ)
(17)
for Ψu(t, τ) := J(t, τ) +
∫
t
0
h(s,X,us)ds,
or equivalently,
E
u
[
J(ν, τ) +
∫ ν
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
≥ J(t, τ) a.s.(18)
A very readable account of this theory appears in Chapter 16, pages 222–241
of Elliott (1982).
4.1. A family of optimal stopping problems. For each admissible control
strategy u(·) ∈ U, we define the maximal conditional expected reward
Zu(t) := esssup
τ∈St,T
E
u(Y u(t, τ)|Ft), t ∈ S,(19)
that can be achieved by the stopper from time t onward, as well as the
“cumulative” quantity
Qu(t) := Zu(t) +
∫
t
0
h(s,X,us)ds= esssup
τ∈St,T
E
u(Y u(τ)|Ft);(20)
in particular,
Zu(t)≥ Y u(t, t) = g(X(t)), V (t) = essinf
u∈U
Zu(t).(21)
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Let us introduce the stopping rules
τut (ε) := inf{s ∈ [t, T ] :g(X(s))≥Z
u(s)− ε}, τut := τ
u
t (0)(22)
for each t ∈ S,0≤ ε < 1. Then τut (ε)≤ τ
u
t .
From the classical martingale approach to the theory of optimal stopping
[e.g., El Karoui (1981) or Karatzas and Shreve (1998), Appendix D], the
following results are well known.
Proposition 4.1. The process Qu(·)≡ {Qu(t),0≤ t≤ T} is a Pu-super-
martingale with paths that are RCLL (Right-Continuous, with Limits from
the Left); it dominates the continuous process Y u(·) given as
Y u(t)≡ Y u(0, t) = g(X(t)) +
∫ t
0
h(s,X,us)ds, 0≤ t≤ T ;(23)
and Qu(·) is the smallest RCLL supermartingale which dominates Y u(·).
In other words, Qu(·) of (20) is the Snell Envelope of the process Y u(·).
Proposition 4.2. For any stopping rules t, ν, θ with t ≤ ν ≤ θ ≤ τut ,
we have the martingale property Eu[Qu(θ)|Fν ] = Q
u(ν) a.s.; in particular,
Qu(· ∧ τu0 ) is a P
u-martingale. Furthermore, Zu(t) = Eu[Y u(t, τut )|Ft] holds
a.s.
4.2. A preparatory lemma. For the proof of several results in this work,
we shall need the following observation; we list it separately, for ease of
reference.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose that t, θ are stopping rules with 0≤ t≤ θ ≤ T , and
that u(·), v(·) are admissible control strategies in U.
(i) Assume that u(·) = v(·) holds a.e. on the stochastic interval [[t, θ]],
in the notation of (15). Then, for any bounded and Fθ-measurable random
variable random variable Ξ, we have
E
v[Ξ|Ft] = E
u[Ξ|Ft] a.s.(24)
In particular, with t= 0 this gives Ev[Ξ] = Eu[Ξ].
(ii) More generally, assume that u(·) = v(·) holds a.e. on {(u,ω) : t(ω) ≤
u≤ θ(ω), ω ∈A} for some A ∈ Ft. Then (24) holds a.e. on the event A.
The reasoning is simple: with the notation Λu(t, θ) := Λu(θ)/Λu(t) from
(3), and using the martingale property of Λu(·) under Pu, we have Eu[Λu(t, θ)|Ft] =
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1 a.s. In conjunction with the Bayes rule for conditional expectations under
equivalent probability measures, this gives
E
u[Ξ|Ft] =
Λu(t) ·E[Λu(t, θ)Ξ|Ft]
Λu(t) ·E[Λu(t, θ)|Ft]
= E[Λu(t, θ)Ξ|Ft]
(25)
= E[Λv(t, θ)Ξ|Ft] = · · ·= E
v[Ξ|Ft] a.s.
The second claim is proved similarly.
4.3. Families directed downward. For any given control strategy v(·) ∈ U
and stopping rules t, θ with 0≤ t≤ θ ≤ T , we shall denote by V[t,θ] the set of
admissible control strategies u(·) as in Lemma 4.3 (i.e., with u(·) = v(·) a.e.
on the stochastic interval [[t, θ]]).
We observe from (19), (8) and Lemma 4.3 that Zu(θ) depends only on
the values that the admissible control strategy u(·) takes over the stochas-
tic interval ]]θ,T ]] := {(s,ω) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω: θ(ω)< s ≤ T} (its values over the
stochastic interval [[0, θ]] are irrelevant for computing Zu(θ)). Thus, for any
given admissible control strategy v(·) ∈ U, we can write the upper value (11)
of the game as
V (θ) = essinf
u∈U
Zu(θ) = essinf
u∈V[0,θ]
Zu(θ) a.s.(26)
Lemma 4.4. The family of random variables {Zu(θ)}u∈V[0,θ] is directed
downward: for any two u1(·) ∈ V[0,θ] and u
2(·) ∈ V[0,θ], there exists an ad-
missible control strategy û(·) ∈ V[0,θ] such that we have a.s.
Z û(θ) = Zu
1
(θ)∧Zu
2
(θ).
Proof. Consider the event A := {Zu
1
(θ)≤ Zu
2
(θ)} ∈ Fθ, and define an
admissible control process u(·) ∈ U via û(s,ω) := v(s,ω) for 0≤ s≤ θ(ω),
û(s,ω) := u1(s,ω) · 1A(ω) + u
2(s,ω) · 1Ac(ω) for θ(ω)< s≤ T.(27)
Consider also the stopping rule τ̂θ := τ
u1
θ · 1A + τ
u2
θ · 1Ac ∈ Sθ,T [notation of
(22)]. Then from Lemma 4.3(ii) we have
Z û(θ) = Eû[Y û(θ, τ ûθ )|Fθ]
= Eu
1
[Y u
1
(θ, τ ûθ )|Fθ] · 1A +E
u2 [Y u
2
(θ, τ ûθ )|Fθ] · 1Ac
≤ Zu
1
(θ) · 1A +Z
u2(θ) · 1Ac
(28)
= Eu
1
[Y u
1
(θ, τu
1
θ )|Fθ] · 1A + E
u2 [Y u
2
(θ, τu
2
θ )|Fθ] · 1Ac
= Eû[Y û(θ, τu
1
θ )|Fθ] · 1A + E
û[Y û(θ, τu
2
θ )|Fθ] · 1Ac
= Eû[Y û(θ, τ̂θ)|Fθ]≤Z
û(θ),
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thus, also Z û(θ) = Zu
1
(θ) · 1A +Z
u2(θ) · 1Ac = Z
u1(θ)∧Zu
2
(θ), a.s. 
Now we can appeal to basic properties of the essential infimum [e.g., Neveu
(1975), page 121], to obtain the following.
Lemma 4.5. For each θ ∈ S, there exists a sequence of admissible con-
trol processes {uk(·)}k∈N ⊂ V[0,θ], such that the corresponding sequence of
random variables {Zu
k
(θ)}k∈N is decreasing, and the essential infimum in
(26) becomes a limit:
V (θ) = lim
k→∞
↓ Zu
k
(θ) a.s.(29)
5. Existence and regularity of the game’s value process. For any given
θ ∈ S , and with {uk(·)}k∈N ⊂ V[0,θ] the sequence of (29), let us look at the
corresponding stopping rules
τu
k
θ := inf{s ∈ [θ,T ] :Z
uk(s) = g(X(s))}, k ∈N,
via (22). Recall that we have Zu
k
(·)≥ Zu
ℓ
(·)≥ g(X(·)) for any integers ℓ≥ k,
thus, also τu
k
θ ≥ τ
uℓ
θ ≥ θ. In other words, the resulting sequence {τ
uk
θ }k∈N is
decreasing, so the limit
τ∗θ := lim
k→∞
↓ τu
k
θ(30)
exists a.s. and defines a stopping rule in Sθ,T . The values of the process u
k(·)
on the stochastic interval [[0, θ]] are irrelevant for computing Zu
k
(s), s≥ θ
or, for that matter, τu
k
θ . But clearly,
τu
k
θ = inf{s ∈ [τ
∗
θ , T ] :Z
uk(s) = g(X(s))}, k ∈N,
holds a.s., so the values of uk(·) on [[0, τ∗θ ]] are irrelevant for computing τ
uk
θ ,
k ∈N.
Thus, there exists a sequence {uk(·)}k∈N ⊂ V[0,τ∗
θ
] of admissible control
strategies, which agree with the given control strategy v(·) ∈ U on the stochas-
tic interval [[0, τ∗θ ]], and for which (30) holds.
We are ready to state and prove our first result.
Theorem 5.1. The game has a value: for every θ ∈ S, we have V (θ) =
V (θ), a.s. In particular, V = V in (9). A bit more generally, for every t ∈ S
and any θ ∈ St,T , we have, almost surely,
essinf
u∈U
esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
E
u(Y u(t, τ)|Ft) = esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
essinf
u∈U
E
u(Y u(t, τ)|Ft).(31)
12 I. KARATZAS AND I.-M. ZAMFIRESCU
Proof. From the preceding remarks, we get the a.s. comparisons
V (θ)≤ Eu
k
[Y u
k
(θ, τu
k
θ )|Fθ]
= E[Λu
k
(θ, τu
k
θ )Y
uk(θ, τu
k
θ )|Fθ]
= E
[
Λv(θ, τ∗θ )Λ
uk(τ∗θ , τ
uk
θ )
{
Y v(θ, τ∗θ ) +
∫ τuk
θ
τ∗
θ
h(s,X,uks)ds
}∣∣∣Fθ
]
for every k ∈N; recall the computation (25). Passing to the limit as k→∞,
and using (30), the boundedness of σ−1, f, h, and the dominated conver-
gence theorem, we obtain the a.s. comparisons
V (θ)≤ E[Λv(θ, τ∗θ )Y
v(θ, τ∗θ )|Fθ] = E
v[Y v(θ, τ∗θ )|Fθ].
Because v(·) is arbitrary, we can take the infimum of the right-hand side of
this inequality over v(·) ∈ U, and conclude
V (θ)≤ essinf
v∈U
E
v[Y v(θ, τ∗θ )|Fθ]
≤ esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
essinf
v∈U
E
v[Y v(θ, τ)|Fθ] = V (θ).
The reverse inequality V (θ)≥ V (θ) is obvious, so we obtain the first claim
of the theorem, namely, V (θ) = V (θ) a.s.
• As for (31), let us observe that for every given u(·) ∈ U we have, on the
strength of Proposition 4.2, the a.s. comparisons
essinf
w∈U
esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
E
w
(
Y w(θ, τ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,ws)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
≤ esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
E
u
(
Y u(θ, τ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
≤ Eu
(
esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
E
u[Y u(θ, τ)|Fθ] +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
= Eu
(
E
u[Y u(θ, τuθ )|Fθ] +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
= Eu
(
Y u(θ, τuθ ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
= Eu[Y u(t, τuθ )|Ft].
Now repeat the previous argument: fix v(·) ∈ U, write this inequality
with u(·) replaced by uk(·) ∈ V[0,τ∗
θ
] [the sequence of (29), (30)] for every
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k ∈ N, and observe that the last term in the above string is now equal to
E
v[Y v(t, τu
k
θ )|Ft]. Then pass to the limit as k→∞ to get, a.s.,
essinf
w∈U
esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
E
w
(
Y w(θ, τ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,ws)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
≤ Ev[Y v(t, τ∗θ )|Ft].
The arbitrariness of v(·) allows us to take the (essential) infimum of the
right-hand side over v(·) ∈ U, and obtain
essinf
w∈U
esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
E
w[Y w(t, τ)|Ft]≤ essinf
v∈U
E
v[Y v(t, τ∗θ )|Ft]
≤ esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
essinf
v∈U
E
v[Y v(t, τ)|Ft],
that is, the inequality (≤) of (31); once again, the reverse inequality is ob-
vious. 
From now on we shall denote by V (·) = V (·) = V (·) the common value
process of this game, and write V = V (0).
Proposition 5.2. The value process V (·) is right-continuous.
Proof. The Snell Envelope Qu(·) of (20) can be taken in its RCLL
modification, as we have already done; so the same is the case for the pro-
cess Zu(·) of (19). Consequently, we obtain lim sups↓t V (s)≤ lims↓tZ
u(s) =
Zu(t), a.s. Taking the infimum over u(·) ∈ U, we deduce lim sups↓t V (s) ≤
V (t), a.s.
In order to show that the reverse inequality
lim inf
s↓t
V (s)≥ V (t) a.s.,(32)
also holds, recall the submartingale property of (17) and (18) and deduce
from it, and from Proposition 1.3.14 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991), that
the right-hand limits
J(t+, τ) := lim
s↓t
J(s, τ) on {t < τ}, J(t+, τ) := g(X(τ)) on {t= τ}
exist and are finite, a.s. on the respective events. Now for any t ∈ [0, T ] and
every stopping rule τ ∈ St,T , recall (16) to obtain
lim inf
s↓t
V (s)≥ lim inf
s↓t
J(s, s∨ τ)
= lim inf
s↓t
J(s, τ) · 1{t<τ} + lim inf
s↓t
J(s, s) · 1{t=τ}.
But on the event {t= τ}, we have almost surely
lim inf
s↓t
J(s, s) = lim inf
s↓t
g(X(s)) = lim
s↓t
g(X(s)) = g(X(t)) = J(t, t)
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by the continuity of g(·); whereas on the event {t < τ}, we have the a.s.
equalities lim infs↓t J(s, τ) = lims↓t J(s, τ) = J(t+, τ). Recalling (18), we ob-
tain from the bounded convergence theorem the a.s. comparisons
lim inf
s↓t
V (s)≥ lim
s↓t
J(s, τ) = Eu
(
lim
s↓t
J(s, τ)
∣∣∣Ft+
)
= Eu
(
lim
s↓t
J(s, τ)
∣∣∣Ft
)
= Eu
[
lim
s↓t
(
J(s, τ) +
∫ s
t
h(r,X,ur)dr
)∣∣∣Ft
]
= lim
s↓t
E
u
[
J(s, τ) +
∫ s
t
h(r,X,ur)dr
∣∣∣Ft
]
≥ J(t, τ).
We have used here the right-continuity of the augmented Brownian filtration
[Karatzas and Shreve (1991), pages 89–92]. The stopping rule τ ∈ St,T is
arbitrary in these comparisons; taking the (essential) supremum over St,T
and recalling (16), we arrive at the desired inequality (32). 
5.1. Some elementary submartingales. By analogy with (22), let us in-
troduce now for each t ∈ S and 0≤ ε < 1 the stopping rules
̺t(ε) := inf{s ∈ [t, T ] :g(X(s))≥ V (s)− ε}, ̺t := ̺t(0).(33)
Since
V (·) = essinf
u∈U
Zu(·)≥ g(X(·))(34)
holds a.s. thanks to (26), we have also
̺t ∨ τ
u
t (ε)≤ τ
u
t , ̺t(ε)≤ τ
u
t (ε) ∧ ̺t.(35)
For each admissible control strategy u(·) ∈ U, let us introduce the family
of random variables
Ru(t) := V (t) +
∫
t
0
h(s,X,us)ds≥ Y
u(t), t ∈ S.(36)
For any time t ∈ S , the quantity Ru(t) represents the cumulative cost to the
controller of using the strategy u(·) on [[0, t]], plus the game’s value at that
time.
Proposition 5.3. For each u(·) ∈ U, the process Ru(·∧̺0) is a P
u-sub-
martingale. A bit more generally, for any stopping rules t, ϑ with t≤ ϑ≤ ̺t,
we have
E
u[Ru(ϑ)|Ft ]≥R
u(t) a.s.,(37)
or, equivalently,
E
u
[
V (ϑ) +
∫ ϑ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
≥ V (t) a.s.(38)
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Furthermore, for any stopping rules s, t, ϑ with 0≤ s≤ t≤ ϑ ≤ ̺t, we have
almost surely
essinf
u∈U
E
u
[
V (ϑ) +
∫ ϑ
s
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
(39)
≥ essinf
u∈U
E
u
[
V (t) +
∫
t
s
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
.
Proof. For any admissible control strategy u(·) ∈ U, and for any stop-
ping rules t, ϑ with 0≤ t≤ ϑ≤ ̺t, we have E
u[Qu(ϑ)|Ft] =Q
u(t) or, equiva-
lently,
E
u
[
Zu(ϑ) +
∫ ϑ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
= Zu(t)≥ V (t) a.s.(40)
from (21), (35) and Propositions 4.1 and 4.2. Now fix a control strategy
v(·) ∈ U, and denote again by V[t,ϑ] the set of admissible control strategies
u(·) as in Lemma 4.3 that agree with it [i.e., satisfy u(·) = v(·) a.e.] on the
stochastic interval [[t, ϑ]]. From this result and (40), we obtain
E
v
[
Zu(ϑ) +
∫ ϑ
t
h(s,X, vs)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
= Zu(t)≥ V (t) a.s.(41)
Now select some sequence {uk(·)}k∈N ⊂V[t,ϑ] as in (29) of Lemma 4.5, substi-
tute uk(·) for u(·) in (41), let k→∞, and appeal to the bounded convergence
theorem for conditional expectations to obtain
E
v
[
V (ϑ) +
∫ ϑ
t
h(s,X, vs)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
≥ V (t) a.s.
This gives (38), therefore, also
E
u
[
V (ϑ) +
∫ ϑ
s
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
≥ Eu
[
V (t) +
∫
t
s
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
,
for all u(·) ∈ U. The claim (39) follows now by taking essential infima over
u(·) ∈ U on both sides. 
Proposition 5.4. For every t ∈ S, we have
V (t) = essinf
u∈U
E
u
(
g(X(̺t)) +
∫ ̺t
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
a.s.(42)
As a consequence,
V (t) = essinf
u∈U
E
u
(
V (̺t) +
∫ ̺t
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
a.s.(43)
and for any given v(·) ∈ U, we get in the notation of (26):
Rv(t) = essinf
u∈V[0,t]
E
u(Ru(̺t)|Ft) a.s.(44)
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Proof. The definition (11) for the upper value of the game gives the in-
equality (≥) in (42). For the reverse inequality (≤), write (38) of Proposition
5.3 with ϑ= ̺t and recall the a.s.equality V (̺t) = g(X(̺t)), a consequence of
the definition of ̺t in (33) and the right-continuity of V (·) from Proposition
5.2; the result is
V (t)≤ Eu
(
V (̺t) +
∫ ̺t
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
= Eu
(
g(X(̺t)) +
∫ ̺t
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
a.s.
for every u(·) ∈ U. Now (42) and (43) follow directly, and so does (44). 
Remark 5.1. Proposition 5.3 implies that the process Ru(·∧̺0), which
is right-continuous by virtue of Proposition 5.2, admits left-limits on (0, T ]
almost surely; cf. Proposition 1.3.14 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991). Thus,
the process Ru(· ∧ ̺0) is a P
u-submartingale with RCLL paths, and the
process V (· ∧ ̺0) has RCLL paths as well.
6. Some properties of the value process. We shall derive in this section
some further properties of V (·), the value process of the stochastic game.
These will be crucial in characterizing, then constructing, a saddle point for
the game in Sections 7 and 9, respectively.
Our first such result provides inequalities in the reverse direction of those
in (37) and (38), but for more general stopping rules and with appropriate
modifications.
Proposition 6.1. For any stopping rules t, θ with 0 ≤ t ≤ θ ≤ T , and
any admissible control process u(·) ∈ U, we have
E
u[Ru(θ)|Ft]≤ esssup
τ∈St,T
E
u(Y u(τ)|Ft)(45)
and
E
u
[
V (θ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ esssup
τ∈St,T
E
u(Y u(t, τ)|Ft) =Z
u(t)(46)
almost surely. We also have
essinf
u∈U
E
u
[
V (θ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ V (t) a.s.(47)
and
essinf
u∈V[0,t]
E
u
[
V (θ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ V (t) a.s.(48)
for any given v(·) ∈ U in the notation used in (26).
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Proof. We recall from (26), (19) and Theorem 5.1 that V (θ) =
ess infu∈UZ
u(θ); and from Proposition 4.1 that, for any given u(·) ∈ U, the
process Qu(·) = Zu(·) +
∫
·
0 h(s,X,us)ds is a P
u-supermartingale. We have,
therefore,
E
u[Ru(θ)|Ft] = E
u
[
V (θ) +
∫ θ
0
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ Eu
[
Zu(θ) +
∫ θ
0
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
(49)
≤ Zu(t) +
∫
t
0
h(s,X,us)ds
= esssup
τ∈St,T
E
u(Y u(τ)|Ft),
which is (45). Now (46) is a direct consequence; and (47) and (48) follow by
taking essential infima over u(·) in U and in V[0,t], respectively. 
We have also the following result, which supplements the “value identity”
of equation (31). In this equation the common value is at most V (t), as we
are taking supremum over a class of stopping rules, Sθ,T , which is smaller
than the class St,T appearing in (11) and (12). The next result tells us exactly
how smaller than V (t) this common value is: it is given by the left-hand side
of (47).
Proposition 6.2. For any stopping rules t, θ with 0 ≤ t ≤ θ ≤ T , we
have almost surely
essinf
u∈U
E
u
[
V (θ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
= essinf
u∈U
esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
E
u(Y u(t, τ)|Ft)(50)
= esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
essinf
u∈U
E
u(Y u(t, τ)|Ft).
Proof. The second equality is, of course, that of (31). For the first,
note that Proposition 5.4 gives V (θ)≤ Eu(g(X(̺θ)) +
∫ ̺θ
θ h(s,X,us)ds|Fθ)
a.s., for every admissible control strategy u(·) ∈ U, thus, also
E
u
[
V (θ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ Eu
(
g(X(̺θ)) +
∫ ̺θ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
(51)
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= Eu(Y u(t, ̺θ)|Ft)
≤ esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
E
u(Y u(t, τ)|Ft) a.s.
Taking essential infima on both sides over u(·) ∈ U, we arrive at the inequal-
ity (≤) in (50).
For the reverse inequality, note from the definition of (19) that
Zu(θ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,us)ds≥ E
u(Y u(t, τ)|Fθ)
holds a.s. for every u(·) ∈ U and every τ ∈ Sθ,T [in fact, with equality for the
stopping rule, τ = τuθ of (22)]. Taking conditional expectations with respect
to Ft on both sides, we obtain
E
u
(
Zu(θ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
≥ Eu(Y u(t, τ)|Ft) a.s.(52)
for all τ ∈ Sθ,T , again with equality for τ = τ
u
θ ; therefore,
E
u
(
Zu(θ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
= esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
E
u(Y u(t, τ)|Ft) a.s.(53)
Fix now an admissible control strategy v(·) ∈ U, and consider a sequence
{uk(·)}k∈N ⊂ V[t,θ] such that V (θ) = limk→∞ ↓ Z
uk(θ) a.s., in the manner of
(29) in Lemma 4.5. Write (53) with uk(·) in place of u(·) and recall property
(24) of Lemma 4.3 to obtain
E
v
(
Zu
k
(θ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X, vs)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
= Eu
k
(
Zu
k
(θ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,uks)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
= esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
E
uk(Y u
k
(t, τ)|Ft)
≥ essinf
u∈U
esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
E
u(Y u(t, τ)|Ft) a.s.
for every k ∈N. Now let k→∞ and use the bounded convergence theorem,
to obtain
E
v
(
V (θ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X, vs)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
≥ essinf
u∈U
esssup
τ∈Sθ,T
E
u(Y u(t, τ)|Ft) a.s.
Since v(·) ∈ U is an arbitrary control strategy, all that remains at this point
is to take the essential infimum of the left-hand side with respect to v(·) ∈ U,
and we are done. 
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We are ready for the main result of this section. It says that infu∈UE
u(Ru(·)),
the best that the controller can achieve in terms of minimizing expected
“running cost plus current value,” does not increase with time; at best, this
quantity is “flat up to ̺0,” the first time the game’s value equals the reward
obtained by terminating the game.
Theorem 6.3. For any stopping rules t, θ with 0≤ t≤ θ ≤ T , we have
essinf
u∈U
E
u(Ru(θ)|Ft)≤R
v(t) a.s.(54)
for any v(·) ∈ U, as well as
inf
u∈U
E
u(Ru(θ))≤ inf
u∈U
E
u(Ru(t))≤ V (0).(55)
The first (resp., the second) of the inequalities in (55) is valid as equality if
θ ≤ ̺t (resp., t≤ ̺0) also holds.
A bit more generally, for any stopping rules s, t, θ with 0≤ s≤ t≤ θ ≤ T ,
we have the a.s. comparisons
essinf
u∈U
E
u
[
V (θ) +
∫ θ
s
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
(56)
≤ essinf
u∈U
E
u
[
V (t) +
∫
t
s
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
≤ V (s).
The first (resp., the second) of the inequalities in (56) is valid as an equality
on the event {θ ≤ ̺t} (resp., {t≤ ̺s}).
Proof. With v(·) ∈ U fixed, and with V[0,t] as in Lemma 4.5, we have
essinf
u∈U
E
u(Ru(θ)|Ft)
= essinf
u∈U
(
E
u
[
V (θ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
+
∫
t
0
h(s,X,us)ds
)
≤ essinf
u∈V[0,t]
E
u
[
V (θ) +
∫ θ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
+
∫
t
0
h(s,X, vs)ds
≤ V (t) +
∫
t
0
h(s,X, vs)ds=R
v(t) a.s.
where the penultimate comparison comes from (48). This proves (54).
To obtain the first inequality in (56), observe that (49) gives
E
u
[
V (θ) +
∫ θ
s
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
≤ Eu
[
Zu(t) +
∫
t
s
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
a.s.
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for all u(·) ∈ U. Proceeding just as before, with v(·) ∈ U arbitrary but fixed,
and with a sequence {uk(·)}k∈N ⊂ V[0,t] such that V (t) = limk→∞ ↓ Z
uk(t)
holds almost surely, as in Lemma 4.5, we have
essinf
u∈U
E
u
[
V (θ) +
∫ θ
s
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
≤ Eu
k
[
V (θ) +
∫ θ
s
h(s,X,uks )ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
≤ Eu
k
[
Zu
k
(t) +
∫
t
s
h(s,X,uks)ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
= Ev
[
Zu
k
(t) +
∫
t
s
h(s,X, vs)ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
for every k ∈N, thus, also
essinf
u∈U
E
u
[
V (θ) +
∫ θ
s
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
≤ Ev
[
V (t) +
∫
t
s
h(s,X, vs)ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
in the limit as k→∞. Take the essential infimum of the right-hand side
over v(·) ∈ U to obtain the desired a.s. inequality
essinf
u∈U
E
u
[
V (θ)+
∫ θ
s
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
≤ essinf
v∈U
E
v
[
V (t)+
∫
t
s
h(s,X, vs)ds
∣∣∣Fs
]
,
the first in (56). [The reverse inequality holds on the event {θ ≤ ̺t}, as we
know from (39).] The second inequality of (56) follows from the first, upon
replacing θ by t, and t by s.
Now (55) follows directly from (56), just by taking s= 0 there. 
7. A martingale characterization of saddle-points. We are now in a po-
sition to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the saddle-point
property (10), in terms of appropriate martingales. These conditions are of
obvious independent interest; they will also prove crucial when we try, in
the next two sections, to prove constructively the existence of a saddle point
(u∗, τ∗) for the stochastic game of control and stopping.
Theorem 7.1. A pair (u∗, τ∗) ∈ U× S is a saddle point as in (10) for
the stochastic game of control and stopping, if and only if the following three
conditions hold:
(i) g(X(τ∗)) = V (τ∗), a.s.
(ii) Ru
∗
(· ∧ τ∗) is a P
u∗-martingale; and
(iii) Ru(· ∧ τ∗) is a P
u-submartingale, for every u(·) ∈ U.
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The present section is devoted to the proof of this result. We shall derive
first the conditions (i)–(iii) from the properties (10) of the saddle; then the
reverse.
Proof of necessity. Let us assume that the pair (u∗, τ∗) ∈ U×S is a
saddle point for the game, that is, that the properties of (10) are satisfied.
• Using the definition of ̺t, the submartingale property E
u∗ [Ru
∗
(̺t)|Ft]≥
Ru
∗
(t) from Proposition 5.3, the a.s. comparisons Y u
∗
(τ∗) ≤ R
u∗(τ∗) and
Y u
∗
(̺τ∗) =R
u∗(̺τ∗), and the first property of the saddle in (10), we obtain
E
u∗(Y u
∗
(τ∗))≤ E
u∗(Ru
∗
(τ∗))≤ E
u∗(Ru
∗
(̺τ∗))
= Eu
∗
(Y u
∗
(̺τ∗))≤ E
u∗(Y u
∗
(τ∗)).
But this gives, in particular, Eu
∗
(Y u
∗
(τ∗)) = E
u∗(Ru
∗
(τ∗)), which, coupled
with the earlier a.s. comparison, gives the stronger one Y u
∗
(τ∗) =R
u∗(τ∗),
thus, also g(X(τ∗)) = V (τ∗).
• Next, consider an arbitrary stopping rule τ ∈ S with 0≤ τ ≤ τ∗ and observe
the string of inequalities
E
u∗(Ru
∗
(τ))≤ Eu
∗
(Ru
∗
(̺τ )) = E
u∗(Y u
∗
(̺τ ))
≤ Eu
∗
(Y u
∗
(τ∗)) = E
u∗(Ru
∗
(τ∗))
from Proposition 5.3, the definition of ̺τ , the first property of the saddle,
and property (i) just proved. On the other hand, from the second property
of a saddle, from property (i) just proved and from the inequality (55), we
get the second string of inequalities
E
u∗(Y u
∗
(τ∗)) = inf
u∈U
E
u(Y u(τ∗)) = inf
u∈U
E
u(Ru(τ∗))
≤ inf
u∈U
E
u(Ru(τ))≤ Eu
∗
(Ru
∗
(τ)).
Combining the two strings, we deduce
E
u∗(Ru
∗
(τ)) = inf
u∈U
E
u(Ru(τ)) = inf
u∈U
E
u(Ru(τ∗)) = E
u∗(Ru
∗
(τ∗))(57)
for every stopping rule τ ∈ S with 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ∗. This shows that R
u∗(· ∧ τ∗)
is a Pu
∗
-martingale [cf. Exercise 1.3.26 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991)], and
condition (ii) is established.
• It remains to show that, for any given v(·) ∈ U, the process Rv(· ∧ τ∗)
is a Pv-submartingale; equivalently, that for any stopping rules t, τ with
0≤ t≤ τ ≤ τ∗, the inequality
E
v
[
V (τ) +
∫ τ
t
h(s,X, vs)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
≥ V (t) holds a.s.(58)
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Let us start by fixing a stopping rule τ as above, and recalling from (47) of
Proposition 6.1 that
V̂ (t; τ) := essinf
u∈U
E
u
[
V (τ) +
∫ τ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ V (t)(59)
holds a.s. We’ll be done, that is, we shall have proved (58), as soon as we
have established that the reverse inequality
V̂ (t; τ)≥ V (t) holds a.s.(60)
as well, for any given τ ∈ S with t≤ τ ≤ τ∗.
To this effect, let us consider for any ε > 0 the event Aε and the stopping
rule θε given as
Aε := {V (t)≥ V̂ (t; τ) + ε} ∈ Ft and θε := t · 1Aε + τ · 1Acε ,
respectively, and note 0≤ t≤ θε ≤ τ ≤ τ∗ ≤ T . From (57), we get
E
u∗(Ru
∗
(t)) = Eu
∗
(Ru
∗
(θε)) = E
u∗ [Ru
∗
(t) · 1Aε +R
u∗(τ) · 1Acε ]
= Eu
∗
[Ru
∗
(t) · 1Aε +E
u∗(Ru
∗
(τ)|Ft) · 1Acε ]
= Eu
∗
[
V (t) · 1Aε +E
u∗
(
V (τ) +
∫ τ
t
h(s,X,u∗s)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
· 1Acε
+
∫
t
0
h(s,X,u∗s)ds
]
≥ Eu
∗
[
V (t) · 1Aε + V̂ (t; τ) · 1Acε +
∫
t
0
h(s,X,u∗s)ds
]
≥ ε · Pu
∗
(Aε) + E
u∗
[
V̂ (t; τ) +
∫
t
0
h(s,X,u∗s)ds
]
.
That is,
E
u∗(Ru
∗
(t))− ε · Pu
∗
(Aε)≥ E
u∗
[
V̂ (t; τ) +
∫
t
0
h(s,X,u∗s)ds
]
.(61)
As in (48), we write now the random variable V̂ (t; τ) of (59) in the form
V̂ (t; τ) = essinf
u∈U∗
[0,t]
E
u
[
V (τ) +
∫ τ
t
h(s,X,us)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
= lim
k→∞
E
uk
[
V (τ) +
∫ τ
t
h(s,X,uks)ds
∣∣∣Ft
]
for some sequence {uk(·)}k∈N in U
∗
[0,t], the set of admissible control strategies
u(·) ∈ U that agree with u∗(·) a.e. on the stochastic interval [[0, t]]. Back into
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(61), this gives
E
u∗(Ru
∗
(t))− ε · Pu
∗
(Aε)
≥ Eu
∗
[
lim
k
E
uk
(
V (τ) +
∫ τ
t
h(s,X,uks)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)
+
∫
t
0
h(s,X,u∗s)ds
]
= Eu
∗
[
lim
k
E
uk
(
V (τ) +
∫ τ
0
h(s,X,uks)ds
∣∣∣Ft
)]
= Eu
∗
[
lim
k
E
uk(Ru
k
(τ)|Ft)
]
= lim
k
E
u∗[Eu
k
(Ru
k
(τ)|Ft)] (bounded convergence)
= lim
k
E
uk [Eu
k
(Ru
k
(τ)|Ft)] [equation (24), Lemma 4.3]
= lim
k
E
uk(Ru
k
(τ))≥ inf
u∈U
E
u(Ru(τ)) = Eu
∗
(Ru
∗
(τ)) = Eu
∗
(Ru
∗
(t)).
The last claim follows from (57), the martingale property of (ii) that this im-
plies, and 0≤ t≤ τ ≤ τ∗. This shows P(Aε) = 0, and we get V (t)< V̂ (t; τ)+ε
a.s., for every ε > 0; letting ε ↓ 0, we arrive at (60), and we are done. 
Proof of sufficiency. Let us suppose now that the pair (u∗, τ∗) ∈
U×S satisfies the properties (i)–(iii) of Theorem 7.1; we shall deduce from
them the properties of (10) for a saddle-point.
The Pu-submartingale property of Ru(·∧τ∗) in property (iii) gives E
u(Ru(τ))≤
E
u(Ru(τ∗)) for all u(·) ∈ U, thus, also
inf
u∈U
E
u(Ru(τ))≤ inf
u∈U
E
u(Ru(τ∗)).
Taking here τ = 0 and using the property (i) for τ∗, as well as the P
u∗ -
martingale property of Ru
∗
(· ∧ τ∗) from (ii), we get
inf
u∈U
E
u(Y u(τ∗)) = inf
u∈U
E
u(Ru(τ∗))≥R
u(0) = V =Ru
∗
(0)
= Eu
∗
(Ru
∗
(τ∗)) = E
u∗(Y u
∗
(τ∗)).
Comparing the two extreme terms in this string, we obtain the second prop-
erty of the saddle.
• We continue by considering stopping rules τ ∈ S with 0≤ τ ≤ τ∗.
For such stopping rules, the fact that Ru
∗
(· ∧ τ∗) is a P
u∗-martingale [prop-
erty (ii)] leads to
Y u
∗
(τ)≤Ru
∗
(τ) = Eu
∗
(Ru
∗
(τ∗)|Fτ ) = E
u∗(Y u
∗
(τ∗)|Fτ ) a.s.(62)
and this gives the first property of the saddle for such stopping rules, upon
taking expectations.
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• Let us consider now stopping rules τ ∈ S with τ∗ ≤ τ ≤ T .
We shall establish for them the first property of the saddle, actually in the
stronger form
E
u∗(Y u
∗
(τ)|Fτ∗)≤ Y
u∗(τ∗) a.s.(63)
Now (63) is equivalent to
g(X(τ∗))≥ E
u∗
(
g(X(τ)) +
∫ τ
τ∗
h(t,X,u∗t )dt
∣∣∣Fτ∗
)
= Eu
∗
[Y u
∗
(τ∗, τ)|Fτ∗ ],
a.s., for every τ ∈ Sτ∗,T , thus to g(X(τ∗))≥Z
u∗(τ∗), a.s. But from (19) and
(21) the reverse of this inequality always holds, so (63) amounts to the
requirement
g(X(τ∗)) =Z
u∗(τ∗) a.s.(64)
To prove (64), recall from condition (ii) that Ru
∗
(·∧τ∗) is a P
u∗-martingale,
and from (36) that it dominates Y u
∗
(· ∧ τ∗). But from Proposition 4.1,
the process Qu
∗
(· ∧ τ∗) is the smallest P
u∗-supermartingale that dominates
Y u
∗
(· ∧ τ∗). Consequently, R
u∗(· ∧ τ∗)≥Q
u∗(· ∧ τ∗) and, equivalently, V (· ∧
τ∗)≥ Z
u∗(· ∧ τ∗), hold a.s. But the reverse inequality also holds, thanks to
the expression (26) for V (·), thus, in fact, V (·∧ τ∗) = Z
u∗(·∧ τ∗), a.s. In par-
ticular, we get V (τ∗) = Z
u∗(τ∗) a.s. Now (64) follows, in conjunction with
condition (i).
• Finally, let us prove the first property of the saddle for an arbitrary stop-
ping rule τ ∈ S . We start with the decomposition
E
u∗(Y u
∗
(τ)) = Eu
∗
(Y u
∗
(τ)1{τ≤τ∗} + Y
u∗(τ)1{τ>τ∗})
= Eu
∗
(Y u
∗
(ρ)1{τ≤τ∗} + Y
u∗(ν)1{τ>τ∗}),
where ρ := τ ∧ τ∗ belongs to S0,τ∗ and ν := τ ∨ τ∗ is in Sτ∗,T . Thus, we have
almost surely
Y u
∗
(ρ)≤ Eu
∗
(Y u
∗
(τ∗)|Fρ) and E
u∗(Y u
∗
(ν)|Fτ∗)≤ Y
u∗(τ∗),
from (62) and (63). Both events {τ ≤ τ∗}, {τ > τ∗} belong to Fρ =Fτ ∩Fτ∗ ,
therefore,
E
u∗(Y u
∗
(τ)) = Eu
∗
(Y u
∗
(ρ) · 1{τ≤τ∗} + Y
u∗(ν) · 1{τ>τ∗})
≤ Eu
∗
(Eu
∗
(Y u
∗
(τ∗)|Fρ) · 1{τ≤τ∗} + E
u∗(Y u
∗
(ν)|Fρ) · 1{τ>τ∗})
= Eu
∗
(Eu
∗
(Y u
∗
(τ∗) · 1{τ≤τ∗}|Fρ) + E
u∗(Y u
∗
(ν)|Fτ∗) · 1{τ>τ∗})
≤ Eu
∗
(Y u
∗
(τ∗) · 1{τ≤τ∗}) +E
u∗(Y u
∗
(τ∗) · 1{τ>τ∗}) = E
u∗(Y u
∗
(τ∗)).
This is the first property of the saddle in (10), established now for arbitrary
τ ∈ S . 
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8. Optimality conditions for control. We shall say that a given admissi-
ble control strategy u˜(·) ∈ U is optimal, if it attains the infimum
V = inf
v∈U
Zv(0), with Zv(0) = sup
τ∈S
E
v[Y (τ)].(65)
Here and in what follows, we are using the notation of (19), (22) and (33).
Clearly, if (u˜, τ˜) is a saddle pair for the stochastic game, then u˜(·) is an
optimal control strategy.
Theorem 8.1 (Necessary and sufficient condition for optimality of con-
trol). A given admissible control strategy u(·) ∈ U is optimal, that is, attains
the supremum in (65), if and only if it is thrifty, that is, satisfies
Ru(· ∧ τu0 ) is a P
u-martingale.(66)
And in this case, for every 0≤ ε < 1, we have in the notation of (33)
τu0 (ε) = ̺0(ε) a.s.(67)
Proof of sufficiency. Let us recall from (35) that τu0 (ε)≤ τ
u
0 holds
a.s. for every 0< ε< 1, and from Proposition 4.2 that the process Qu(·∧ τu0 )
is a Pu-martingale. Therefore, if u(·) is thrifty, we have
V ≤ Zu(0) = Eu
[
Zu(τu0 (ε)) +
∫ τu0 (ε)
0
h(s,X,us)ds
]
≤ Eu
[
ε+ g(X(τu0 (ε))) +
∫ τu0 (ε)
0
h(s,X,us)ds
]
≤ ε+Eu
[
V (τu0 (ε)) +
∫ τu0 (ε)
0
h(s,X,us)ds
]
= ε+Eu[Ru(τu0 (ε))] = ε+ V.
In this string the second inequality comes from the definition of τu0 (ε) in (22);
whereas the last equality is a consequence of thriftiness and of the inequality
τu0 (ε)≤ τ
u
0 . This gives the comparison V ≤ Z
u(0)≤ ε+V for every 0< ε< 1,
therefore, Zu(0) = V , the optimality of u(·). 
Proof of necessity. Let us suppose now that u(·) ∈ U is optimal; we
shall show that it is thrifty, and that (67) holds for every 0≤ ε < 1.
• We shall show first that, for this optimal u(·), we have τu0 = ̺0 a.s., that
is, (67) with ε= 0.
Let us observe that the Pu-martingale property of Qu(· ∧ τu0 ), coupled
with the Pu-submartingale property of Ru(· ∧ ̺0) from Proposition 5.3, and
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the a.s. inequality ̺0 ≤ τ
u
0 from (35) give
Zu(0)− Eu
∫ ̺0
0
h(s,X,us)ds
= Eu(Zu(̺0))
= Eu[Zu(̺0) · 1{τu0 =̺0} +Z
u(̺0) · 1{τu0 >̺0}]
≥ Eu[Zu(̺0)1{τu0 =̺0} + g(X(̺0))1{τu0 >̺0}](68)
= Eu[Zu(̺0)1{τu0 =̺0} + V (̺0)1{τ
u
0 >̺0}
]
≥ Eu[V (̺0) · 1{τu0 =̺0} + V (̺0) · 1{τu0 >̺0}]
= Eu[V (̺0)],
as well as
Zu(0)≥ Eu
[
V (̺0) +
∫ ̺0
0
h(s,X,us)ds
]
(69)
= Eu[Ru(̺0)]≥R
u(0) = V.
We shall argue the validity of τu0 = ̺0 by contradiction: we know from
(35) that ̺0 ≤ τ
u
0 holds a.s., so let us assume
P
u(τu0 > ̺0)> 0.(70)
Under the assumption (70), the first inequality in (68)—thus also in (69)—is
strict; but this contradicts the optimality of u(·) ∈ U. Thus, as claimed, we
have τu0 = ̺0 a.s. A similar argument leads to τ
u
0 (ε) = ̺0(ε) a.s., for every
0< ε < 1, and (67) is proved.
• To see that this optimal u(·) ∈ U must also be thrifty, just observe that,
as we have seen, equality prevails in (69); and that this, coupled with (67),
gives Ru(0) = Eu[Ru(τu0 )]. It follows that the P
u-submartingale Ru(· ∧ ̺0)≡
Ru(· ∧ τu0 ) is in fact a P
u-martingale. 
The characterization of optimality presented in Theorem 8.1 is in the
spirit of a similar characterization for optimal control with discretionary
stopping in Dubins and Savage (1965) and in Maitra and Sudderth [(1996a),
page 75]. In the context of these two sources, optimality amounts to the
simultaneous validity of two conditions, “thriftiness” [i.e., condition (67)]
and “equalization.” In our context every control strategy is equalizing, so
this latter condition becomes moot.
Proposition 8.2. If the admissible control strategy u(·) ∈ U is thrifty,
then it is optimal; and the pair (u, τu0 ) = (u,̺0) ∈ U × S is then a saddle
point for the stochastic game of control and stopping.
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Proof. The first claim follows directly from Theorem 8.1. Now let us
make a few observations:
(i) By the definition of ̺0 in (33) and the right-continuity of the process
V (·), we have the a.s. equality V (̺0) = g(X(̺0)).
(ii) The process Ru(· ∧ ̺0) is a P
u-martingale; this is because u(·), being
optimal, must also be thrifty, as we saw in Theorem 8.1, and because ̺0 = τ
u
0
holds a.s.
(iii) From Proposition 5.3, the process Rv(· ∧ ̺0) is a P
v-submartingale,
for every v(·) ∈ U.
From these observations and Theorem 7.1, it is now clear that the pair
(u,̺0) is a saddle point of the stochastic game. 
9. Constructing a thrifty control strategy and a saddle. The theory of
the previous section, culminating with Proposition 8.2, shows that in order
to construct a saddle point for our stochastic game of control and stopping,
all we need to do is find an admissible control strategy u∗(·) ∈ U which is
thrifty; to wit, for which the condition (66) holds. Then the pair (u∗, τu
∗
0 )
will be a saddle point for our stochastic game.
To accomplish this, we shall start by assuming that, for each (t,ω), the
mappings
a 7→ f(t,ω, a) and a 7→ h(t,ω, a) are continuous,(71)
and that for the so-called Hamiltonian function
H(t,ω, a, p) := 〈p,σ−1(t,ω)f(t,ω, a)〉+ h(t,ω, a),(72)
t ∈ [0, T ], ω ∈ Ω, a ∈ A,p ∈ Rn, the mapping a 7→H(t,ω, a, p) attains its in-
fimum over the set A at some a∗ ≡ a∗(t,ω, p) ∈ A, for any given (t,ω, p) ∈
[0, T ]×Ω×Rn, namely,
inf
a∈A
H(t,ω, a, p) =H(t,ω,a∗(t,ω, p), p).(73)
[This is the case, for instance, if the set A is compact and the mapping a 7→
H(t,ω, a, p) continuous.] Then it can be shown [see Lemma 1 in Benesˇ (1970),
or Lemma 16.34 in Elliott (1982)] that the mapping a∗ : ([0, T ]×Ω)×Rn→A
can be selected to be (P ⊗B(Rn)/A)-measurable.
We shall deploy the martingale methodologies introduced in stochastic
control in the seminal papers of Rishel (1970), Duncan and Varaiya (1971),
Davis and Varaiya (1973) and Davis (1973), and presented in book form
in Chapter 16 of Elliott (1982). The starting point of this approach is the
observation that, for every admissible control strategy u(·) ∈ U, the process
Ru(· ∧ ̺0) = V (· ∧ ̺0) +
∫
·∧̺0
0
h(t,X,ut)dt(74)
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is a Pu-submartingale with RCLL paths, and bounded uniformly on [0, T ]×
Ω; recall Propositions 5.3, 5.2 and Remark 5.5. This implies that the process
Ru(· ∧ ̺0) admits a Doob–Meyer decomposition
Ru(· ∧ ̺0) = V +M
u(·) +∆u(·).(75)
Here Mu(·) is a uniformly integrable Pu-martingale with RCLL paths and
Mu(0) = 0, Mu(·) ≡Mu(̺0) on [[̺0, T ]]; the process ∆
u(·) is predictable,
with nondecreasing paths, ∆u(T )≡∆u(̺0) integrable, and ∆
u(0) = 0.
• A key observation now is that the Pu-martingale Mu(·) can be represented
as a stochastic integral, in the form
Mu(·) =
∫
·
0
〈γ(t), dW u(t)〉.(76)
Here W u(·) is the Pu-Brownian motion of (4), and γ(·) a predictable (P-
measurable) process that satisfies
∫ T
0 ‖γ(t)‖
2 dt <∞ and γ(·)≡ 0 on [[̺0, T ]],
a.s.
This is, of course, the predictable representation property of the filtration
F = {Ft}0≤t≤T [the augmentation of the filtration F
W
t = σ(W (s); 0 ≤ s ≤
t),0 ≤ t≤ T , generated by the P-Brownian motion W (·)] under the equiv-
alent change (5) of probability measure. For this result of Fujisaki et al.
(1972), which is very useful in filtering theory, see Rogers and Williams
(1987), pages 323 or Karatzas and Shreve (1998), Lemma 1.6.7. An impor-
tant aspect of this representation is that the same process γ(·) works for
every u(·) ∈ U in (76).
Next, let us take any two admissible control strategies u(·) and v(·) in
U, and compare the resulting decompositions (75) on the stochastic interval
[[0, ̺0]]. In conjunction with (74)–(76), (72) and (4), this gives
∆v(·)−∆u(·) =
∫
·
0
[H(t,X, vt, γ(t))−H(t,X,ut, γ(t))]dt(77)
on the interval [[0, ̺0]]. A brief, self-contained argument for the claims (76)
and (77) is presented in the Appendix.
Analysis. If we know that uˇ(·) ∈ U is a thrifty control strategy, that
is, the process Ruˇ(· ∧ τ uˇ0 ) is a P
uˇ-martingale, then Ruˇ(· ∧ ̺0) is also a P
uˇ-
martingale [just recall that we have 0≤ ̺0 ≤ τ
uˇ
0 from (35)], thus ∆
uˇ(·)≡ 0
a.s. But then (77) gives
∆v(·) =
∫
·
0
[H(t,X, vt, γ(t))−H(t,X, uˇt, γ(t))]dt on [[0, ̺0]];
and because this process has to be nondecreasing for every admissible control
strategy v(·) ∈ U, we deduce the following necessary condition for thriftiness:
H(t,X, uˇt, γ(t)) = inf
a∈A
H(t,X,a, γ(t)) a.e. on [[0, ̺0]].(78)
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This is also known as the stochastic version of Pontryagin’s Maximum Prin-
ciple; cf. Kushner (1965), Haussmann (1986) and Peng (1990, 1993).
Synthesis. The stochastic maximum principle of (78) suggests consid-
ering the admissible control strategy u∗(·) ∈ U defined by
u∗t =
{
a∗(t,X,γ(t)), 0≤ t≤ ̺0
a♯, ̺0 < t≤ T
}
(79)
for an arbitrary but fixed element a♯ of the control set A. We are using here
the “measurable selector” mapping a∗ : [0, T ]×Ω×Rn→A of (73).
With this choice, (77) leads to the comparison
∆v(·) = ∆u
∗
(·) +
∫
·
0
[H(t,X, vt, γ(t))−H(t,X,u
∗
t , γ(t))]dt≥∆
u∗(·)
on the interval [[0, ̺0]], therefore, also R
v(· ∧ ̺0)≥ V +M
v(·)+∆u
∗
(·) from
(75), for every v(·) ∈ U. Taking expectations under Pv, we obtain
0≤ Ev[∆u
∗
(̺0)]≤ E
v[Rv(̺0)]− V ∀ v(·) ∈ U.
But now we can take the infimum over v(·) ∈ U in the above string, and
obtain
0≤ inf
v∈U
E
v[∆u
∗
(̺0)]≤ inf
v∈U
E
v[Rv(̺0)]− V = 0,
where the last equality comes from (55) and the sentence directly below it.
We deduce
inf
v∈U
E
v[∆u
∗
(̺0)] = 0, thus also ∆
u∗(̺0) = 0 a.s.(80)
from fairly standard weak compactness arguments, as in Davis (1973) page 592,
Davis (1979) or Elliott (1982) pages 238–240.
• We follow now a reasoning similar to that used to prove (64) in Theorem
7.1: first, we note from (80) that
Ru
∗
(· ∧ ̺0) = V +
∫
·
0
〈γ(t), dW u
∗
(t)〉 is a Pu
∗
-martingale,(81)
and from (36) that it dominates Y u
∗
(· ∧ ̺0). But from Proposition 4.1,
the process Qu
∗
(· ∧ ̺0) is the smallest P
u∗ -supermartingale that dominates
Y u
∗
(· ∧ ̺0). We deduce that R
u∗(· ∧ ̺0) ≥ Q
u∗(· ∧ ̺0) and, equivalently,
V (· ∧ ̺0) ≥ Z
u∗(· ∧ ̺0), hold a.s. The reverse of this inequality also holds,
thanks to the expression (26) for V (·), thus, in fact, V (· ∧ ̺0) =Z
u∗(· ∧ ̺0).
In particular, we have almost surely, Zu
∗
(̺0) = V (̺0) = g(X(̺0)) (recall
the definition of ̺0), thus, also τ
u∗
0 ≤ ̺0 from (22). Again, the reverse in-
equality holds, thanks now to (35), so, in fact, τu
∗
0 = ̺0 holds a.s.
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We conclude that the property (81) leads to the thriftiness condition (66)
for the admissible control strategy u∗(·) ∈ U defined in (79). In conjunction
with Proposition 8.2, this establishes the following existence and character-
ization result:
Theorem 9.1. Under the assumptions (71)–(73) of this section, the pair
(u∗, ̺0) ∈ U×S of (79) and (33) is a saddle point for the stochastic game,
and we have ̺0 = τ
u∗
0 a.s., in the notation of (22). Furthermore, the process
V (· ∧ ̺0) is a continuous P-semimartingale.
Only the last claim needs discussion; from (74), (81) and (72), we get the
representation
V (t) = V −
∫ t
0
H(s,X,u∗s, γ(s))ds+
∫ t
0
〈γ(s), dW (s)〉(82)
for 0≤ t≤ ̺0, and the claim follows.
This equation (82) can be written equivalently “backward,” as
V (t) = g(X(̺0)) +
∫ ̺0
t
H(s,X,u∗s, γ(s))ds−
∫ ̺0
t
〈γ(s), dW (s)〉(83)
for 0≤ t≤ ̺0. Suitably modified to account for the constraint V (·)≥ g(X(·)),
and with an appropriate definition for the “adjoint process” γ(·) on [[̺0, T ]],
the equation (83) can be extended to hold on [[0, T ]]; this brings us into con-
tact with the backward stochastic differential equation approach to stochas-
tic games [Cvitanic´ and Karatzas (1996), Hamade`ne and Lepeltier (1995,
2000), Hamade`ne (2006)].
APPENDIX
In order to make this paper as self-contained as possible, we shall present
here a brief argument for the representation (76) of the Pu-martingale Mu(·)
in the Doob–Meyer decomposition (75), and for the associated identity (77).
We start with the “Bayes rule” computation
Mu(t) = Eu[Mu(T )|Ft] = E
u[Mu(̺0)|Ft]
(84)
=
E
u[Λu(̺0)M
u(̺0)|Ft]
Λu(t ∧ ̺0)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T [e.g. Karatzas and Shreve (1991), page 193]; then the mar-
tingale representation property of the Brownian filtration (ibid., page 182)
shows that the numerator of (84) can be expressed as the stochastic integral
Nu(t) := Eu[Λu(̺0)M
u(̺0)|Ft] =
∫ t
0
〈ξu(s), dW (s)〉, 0≤ t≤ T,(85)
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with respect to W (·), of some predictable process ξu : [0, T ]×Ω→ Rn that
satisfies ξu(·) ≡ 0 a.e. on [[̺0, T ]], and
∫ T
0 ‖ξ
u(t)‖2 dt <∞ a.s. We have re-
called in (84) and (85) that Mu(·) ≡Mu(̺0) a.e. on [[̺0, T ]], and N
u(0) =
Mu(0)Λu(0) = 0.
On the other hand, for the exponential martingale of (3), we have the
stochastic integral equation
Λu(t ∧ ̺0) = 1+
∫ t
0
Λu(s)〈ϕu(s), dW (s)〉, 0≤ t≤ T,(86)
where we have set ϕu(t) := σ−1(t,X)f(t,X,ut) for 0≤ t≤ ̺0, and ϕ
u(t) := 0
for ̺0 < t≤ T . Applying Itoˆ’s rule to the ratio M
u(·) =Nu(·)/Λu(· ∧ ̺0) of
(84), in conjunction with (85), (86) and (4), we obtain then, for 0≤ t≤ T ,
Mu(t) =
∫ t
0
〈γu(s), dW u(s)〉 where γu(t) :=
ξu(t)−Nu(t)ϕu(t)
Λu(t)
(87)
is clearly predictable; it satisfies γu(·) ≡ 0 a.e. on [[̺0, T ]], as well as∫ T
0 ‖γ
u(t)‖2 dt <∞ a.s.
• It remains to argue that the stochastic integrand of (87) does not depend
on the admissible control process u(·) ∈ U, as claimed in (76). Indeed, for
arbitrary u(·) ∈ U and u(·) ∈ U, we have
Rv(t ∧ ̺0)−
∫ t∧̺0
0
[h(s,X, vs)− h(s,X,us)]ds
=Ru(t∧ ̺0) = V +∆
u(t) +
∫ t
0
〈γu(s), dW u(s)〉
= V +∆u(t) +
∫ t
0
〈γu(s), dW v(s)〉
+
∫ t
0
〈γv(s), ϕv(s)〉ds−
∫ t
0
〈γu(s), ϕu(s)〉ds, 0≤ t≤ T.
Let us compare now this decomposition with the consequence
Rv(t ∧ ̺0) = V +∆
v(t) +
∫ t
0
〈γv(s), dW v(s)〉, 0≤ t≤ T,
of (75) and (87). Identifying martingale terms, we see that γu(·) = γv(·) holds
a.e. on [0, T ]×Ω, thus, (76) holds; identifying terms of bounded variation,
we arrive at (77).
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